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Abstract. Humans sometimes forage or distribute the products of foraging in ways that do not
maximize individual energetic return rates. As an alternative to hypotheses that rely on reciprocal
altruism to counter the costs of inefficiency, we suggest that the cost itself could be recouped through
signal benefit. Costly signaling theory predicts that signals can provide fitness benefits when costs are
honestly linked to signaler quality, and this information is broadcast to potential mates and
competitors. Here, we test some predictions of costly signaling theory against empirical data on human
food acquisition and sharing patterns. We show that at least two types of marine foraging, turtle
hunting and spearfishing, as practiced among the Meriam (a Melanesian people of Torres Strait,
Australia) meet key criteria for costly signaling: signal traits are (1) differentially costly or beneficial
in ways that are (2) honestly linked to signaler quality, and (3) designed to effectively broadcast the
signal. We conclude that relatively inefficient hunting or sharing choices may be maintained in a
population if they serve as costly and reliable signals designed to reveal the signaler’s qualities to 
observers.
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- 1 -Introduction
Human foragers often make decisions that lead them to bypass alternative activities with higher energy
gain rates, provide widely shared goods without repayment, or incur an increased risk of injury. These
decisions have often been explained by the benefits of a sexual division of labor in parental investment
(e.g., Hurtado et al. 1992), the optimization of macronutrients (e.g., Hill 1988), or reduction of
consumption variance (e.g., Smith 1988). In particular, the practice common to many hunter-gatherer
societies of widespread or group-wide sharing of large prey captured by any subset of the group is
conventionally explained as a form of risk reduction where all ultimately benefit from a reciprocal
sharing of unpredictable harvests (reviews in Hawkes 1992; Winterhalder 1997).
While some types of food seem to be distributed in ways that conform to delayed reciprocity (Gurven
et al. 2000), recent studies (Hawkes 1993; Bliege Bird and Bird 1997) have challenged its ability to
explain the wide variety of sharing patterns to which it has been claimed to apply. The cases that seem
least congruent with strategies of delayed reciprocity are those associated with public distributions of
food in which the acquirer does not control access to the harvest or its distribution, and may not even
reserve a portion for him- or herself (Wiessner 1996). Under these conditions, acquirers seem unlikely
to be able to direct shares to reciprocators and withhold them from free-riders, as is required to solve
the collective action problem (e.g., prisoner’s dilemma) associated with enforcing delayed reciprocity.
Similar challenges to the primacy of reciprocal altruism (RA) on both theoretical and empirical fronts
are also found in recent literature on non-human behavior (reviews in Dugatkin 1997; Pusey and
Packer 1997). Many theorists have suggested the paradigm may require extensive revisions (Clements
and Stephens 1995; Connor 1996; Dugatkin 1997; Roberts 1998).
An alternative explanation for such "economically irrational" decisions is that under some
circumstances they could serve as an honest signal of one or more dimensions of fitness-related quality
(Neiman 1998; Boone 1998; Sosis 2000; Smith and Bliege Bird 2000). Costly signaling theory (CST)
provides a powerful framework for explaining two paradoxical observations: the persistence of
wasteful phenotypes when natural selection is assumed to create greater efficiency, and the evolution
of honest communication despite the pervasive conflicts of interest underlying evolutionary processes
(Zahavi 1975, 1977; Grafen 1990; Johnstone 1995, 1997; Getty 1998). CST proposes that
communication between individuals with conflicting interests can be evolutionarily stable if the signal
honestly advertises an underlying quality of interest to observers. Advertising is kept honest and thus
mutually beneficial to both signaler and observer as long as the cost or benefit of advertisement is so
closely tied to the quality of the signaler that faking it costs more than the signal is worth. If this holds,
the correlation between the quality of a signaler and the quality or intensity of the signal will be
maintained by differences in marginal cost or benefit, allowing recipients to reliably discriminate
among competing signalers. When these conditions are met, honest signals and reliable
communication will be evolutionarily stable, even when signaler and recipient are antagonists or 
competitors.
The hypothesis that hunting might serve as a form of status competition among men interested in
"showing off" to a public audience is not new (Hawkes 1990, 1991). Here, we recast the "show-off"
model using a payoff structure compatible with CST (Smith and Bliege Bird 2000). We propose that
individuals of high phenotypic quality might reap higher benefits or pay lower costs to acquire
skill-based resources or to unconditionally share their harvest. These benefits (material, political, and
reproductive) flow from observers who find it in their interest to behave in ways that improve the
relative advantage, status, or social dominance of signalers, ultimately enhancing signaler fitness.
Analyzed according to CST, this is not delayed reciprocity involving an exchange of substance (to the
observer) for social status (to the signaler), but rather a form of by-product mutualism. The payoff to
the observer comes from the usefulness of the information inferred from the signal: he or she should
- 2 -be able to evaluate the signaler’s suitability as a competitor, mate, or ally by attending to the signal
rather than through more costly or unreliable means of assessing the signaler’s abilities or hidden
qualities. The high cost or low benefit of faking the signal guarantees that signalers will not engage in
false advertising, and that observers will pay attention. Costly signaling can thus spread (by natural
selection or imitation) because of its mutual benefits to both signalers and observers.
Here, we test the costly signaling hypothesis among the Meriam (a Melanesian people of Torres Strait,
Australia). We evaluate two candidate foraging activities (spearfishing on the reef at low tide, and
hunting turtle for public feasts), to determine whether these hunt types meet key criteria for costly
signaling in being (1) differentially costly or beneficial in ways that are (2) honestly linked to signaler
quality, and (3) designed to effectively broadcast the signal to the intended audience. We propose that
accomplished spearfishers signal such qualities as hand-eye coordination, stealth, and patience, while
successful turtle hunters signal strength, risk-taking, and (in the case of hunt leaders) a variety of
cognitive and leadership abilities to potential allies, mates, and competitors.
Methods
Mer (a.k.a. Murray Island) is a small (1.6  2.2 km) island on the northern end of the Great Barrier
Reef, 140 km from New Guinea in Australia’s Torres Strait. The island’s current population is 430
individuals of Torres Strait Islander descent, scattered in approximately 85 households. The Torres
Strait as a whole is administered by the State of Queensland and the Commonwealth of Australia.
Prior to about 1975, when Australian welfare payments were first made available to all indigenous
Australians, the Meriam were nearly full-time subsistence horticulturalists and marine foragers
planting tropical yams, bananas, sugar cane, and introduced new world crops such as manioc, sweet
potatoes, and corn, and harvesting marine fish, shellfish, and sea turtles. Today, fishing and shellfish
collecting remain a critical component of Meriam subsistence economy: mean per capita after-sharing
consumption rates average 630 kcal of meat and 40 g of protein. More than 80% of these calories are
supplied by turtle when in season. For additional ethnographic description and previous work among
the Meriam, see Haddon (1906), Beckett (1988), Sharp (1993), Bliege Bird et al. (1995), Bird and
Bliege Bird (1997, 2000), Bliege Bird and Bird (1997), and Smith and Bliege Bird (2000).
Observations of Meriam foraging choices, time allocation, and food-sharing strategies reported here
were conducted over several periods totaling 27 months between January 1993 and July 1999. Much
of this field research was specifically designed to test hypotheses related to the origin and maintenance
of the human sexual division of labor, and to determine the nature of the tradeoffs affecting men’s and
women’s foraging decisions.
Time allocation to intertidal activities (spearfishing, shellfish collecting) was measured through focal
individual follows occurring during randomly selected days during the spring ebbing tide. Locations
along the foreshore were observed from the midpoint of the ebbing tide, before the reef was fully
exposed, for at least 2 h or until the last forager had left the reef. During the intertidal sampling period,
we recorded the moment-by-moment behavior of at least one individual to arrive during the sample,
and if the individual remained after the interval ended, we remained to completely record the episode.
We observed the reef flat habitat for a total of 118.5 h over 41 spring ebb-tide days, recording 338.1
forager-hours of subsistence activity in 210 partial and full foraging follows of 94 men, women, and
children entering the reef flat. We then analyzed the percentage of total foraging time each forager
devoted to all potential intertidal activities during the follow.
- 3 -We analyzed the reef as a bounded habitat within which there are "hunt types" sensu Smith (1991). All
hunt types are simultaneously available options within the ecological habitat "reef flat at low tide":
reef flat collecting, rocky shore harvesting, and spearfishing (Bird and Bliege Bird 1997, 2000). Reef
flat collecting involves mobile search of shellfish, with in situ processing to increase the utility of the
load (Bird and Bliege Bird 1997). Spearfishing involves search and travel across the reef looking for
encounters with mobile prey (small fish and squid 250 g+) to the exclusion of all other prey; when
prey are detected, the hunter stalks the prey and launches his spear from a distance. Both hunt types
occur in the same patch during the same period of time, while the reef is exposed at low tide. The hunt
types vary in how spatially exclusive they are within the habitat: spearfishing and shellfish collecting
are the only two major hunt types in which the forager engaged in exclusive search for prey frequently
encounters and ignores prey in the other hunt type. These are not the complete complement of hunt
types simultaneously available, but they are the three in which adults spend more than 90% of their
foraging time while on the reef at low tide. Other minor hunt types are handline fishing from the reef
edge and in deeper lagoons, netting sardines, hunting octopus, and diving from the reef edge to take
underwater prey by hand. Gross foraging return rates for each hunt type (not including energetic
expenditure - assumed to be roughly equal for all reef hunt types) were calculated from the moment an
individual stepped onto the exposed reef and began to engage in targeted search for particular prey
types. The macronutrient content of fin-fish and shellfish was obtained through published sources and
through individual analysis of samples collected on Mer (Hirth 1971; Sidwell 1981; Brand Miller et al. 
1993).
For a detailed description of methods used to collect turtle hunting and sharing data see Bliege Bird
and Bird (1997); the results presented here on turtle hunting and sharing are a reanalysis of those data.
The acquisition of over 120 turtles was noted through daily sampling of the entire village during the
nesting season (October-April) in 1994-1995, and ad lib sampling of the village during the 1994 and
1998 hunting seasons (May-September). Nearly every successful hunt or collection of turtle was
recorded, with information obtained on acquirer(s), place acquired, method of acquisition, and
subsequent distribution though informant interview.
There are two primary types of marine turtle acquisition on Mer: turtle hunting (nam deraimer) and
turtle collection (nam terpei). Turtle hunting occurs throughout the year, but is the only way to acquire
turtles between May and September (Kob Kerker), when green turtles (Chelonia mydas) feed and mate
on shallow reefs about 16-20 km from Mer. Field observations indicate that turtles captured on hunts
range from 100 to 150 kg live weight, with an average edible yield of 50.1 kg (Bliege Bird and Bird 
1997). Hunters head out to the hunting grounds in open boats powered with outboard motors, often in
cooperation with at least one other hunting boat. Among Meriam turtle hunters, there are three distinct
roles: hunt leader (ariemer-le), jumper (arpeir-le), and driver, or tiller-man (korizer-le). Hunt leaders
organize and direct the hunt; there is always only one leader per hunt, regardless of crew size. Hunt
leaders bear the cost of organizing the hunt and ensuring boats and fuel to spare. They direct the crew
to particular locations, decide whether prey encountered is worth pursuing, orchestrate the chase, and
direct jumpers when to jump from the boat to secure the turtle. Hunt leaders are invested with public
recognition and receive full credit for the kill regardless of whether or not they directly participate in 
capture.
The hunt proceeds as follows. While one man drives, the rest of the crew stands toward the bow
scanning the reef for signs of turtle. The hunt leader directs the driver and coordinates with crews in
other boats if present. When a turtle is spotted, the hunt leader makes a decision whether to pursue it
based on its size (large turtles have more meat) and sex (female turtles have more fat). The boat(s)
then give chase, keeping the turtle away from the reef edge. When the turtle tires, the hunt leader
usually directs his jumper to launch himself from the bow of the boat with a rope attached to his upper
arm. The jumper then attempts to secure the turtle by locking his arms around the flippers and, if
- 4 -successful, the crew then pulls him and the turtle on board.
Turtle hunting occurs primarily in the context of public feasting events: hunters choose to hunt in
response to a request from feast organizers to provide turtles for consumption at a previously
announced feast. The biggest and most elaborate Meriam feasts occur in the context of coming-of-age
celebrations and funeral ceremonies (see Smith and Bliege Bird 2000 for further details). In contrast to
turtle hunting, turtles are also collected (n=88 events), primarily in the context of household
provisioning, but also for feasts, by men of all ages, women, and children. This occurs only when they
can be harvested on beaches during the nesting season (Nam Kerker: October-April), although during
these months some turtles are also hunted on nearby reefs. In the nesting season, turtles are collected at
night or during the early morning hours as they crawl onto sandy beaches above the mean high water
mark to lay their eggs. Turtles are acquired by flipping them onto their backs, trussing their flippers
with ropes, and hauling them by boat back to the acquirer’s household where they are kept alive until
butchered. When butchered for "private" consumption, turtle shares are distributed in large, uncooked
portions (10-11 kg) of meat, fat, organs, and eggs among nearby households, with the size of portions
kept by the butchering household determined primarily by the number of demanders (hereafter termed
"household consumption" sensu Bliege Bird and Bird 1997). While hunting a turtle is a costly activity
in which the benefit is acquired through the social value of the hunt, collecting a turtle is an activity
which has little signaling potential and in which the benefit is primarily nutritional. However, there
may be some signal value of displays of generosity among neighbors as turtle portions are shared
according to the Meriam ethic of debe tonar ("the good way," which involves sharing without
expectation of return).
All statistical analyses were performed using Statview (SAS). Large-sample means tests were
performed after testing for normality and equality of variance using either one- or two-tailed t-tests
depending upon the prediction tested, while tests on small samples and those violating the assumptions
of parametric tests used two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests. All means are reported with associated 
SEs.
Results
Spearfishing as costly signal
There are significant sex differences in time allocation to hunt types in the intertidal: on average, men
spend 63% of their reef foraging time spearing, while for women this value is only 9% (t=6.00, df=66, 
P=0.001), and women spend 76% and men 31% of their time shellfish collecting (t=4.50, df=66, 
P=0.001). The majority of men never collect shellfish at all, nor do they combine spearing with
shellfish collecting in a single visit to the reef at low tide: 78.6% of 21 men in the time allocation
sample spent all of their foraging time spearfishing.
Is spearfishing a signal? The decision men make to spear fish nearly exclusively (rather than collect
shellfish) violates simple energy-maximizing prey choice models, because (1) on average, continuing
to search for fish to spear (292±135 kcal/h, n=26) offers lower overall energy returns than shellfishing 
(1,492±173 kcal/h, n=47) while in the reef flat at low tide (t=4.672, df=71, P=0.0001) and (2)
on-encounter returns for the most skilled spearfisher (2,505±778 kcal/h) are equivalent to the
on-encounter returns for the lowest-ranked shellfish prey still in the optimal diet breadth
(2,214±414 kcal/h) (see Table 1).
- 5 -Table 1. Mean±SE return rates and mean time allocated to intertidal hunt types by Meriam men and
women. On-encounter returns for each prey type are calculated from the moment a forager committed
to pursuing a particular individual prey item. For shellfish, pursuits begin when a forager bends down
to pick up the item; for spearing, pursuits begin when a forager spots the signs of prey and drops into a
stalk stance to pursue it; for rocky shore harvesting, encounters are defined as the moment a
productive patch is found. Encounter return rates for all prey types include time spent handling
(pursuit and processing) the item while in the foraging habitat: no cooking times are included since
cooking methods for each item can vary from minutes to hours depending upon the dish prepared.
Mean time allocation per person shows the mean percentage of total "reef habitat at low tide" time
devoted to each hunt type averaged for each of 19 women and 21 men observed more than once on the
reef during the random time allocation scans
Reef collecting Reef spearing Rocky shore 
On-encounter returns (kcal/h) by
prey type
Tridacna gigas: 
13,064±4750
All fish: 
2,505±778
Nerita: 
1,106±465
Hippopus: 6,859±464
Asaphis: 
455±52
Tridacna maxima: 
4,418±708
Trochus: 3,904±467
Lambis: 3,412±205
Cypraea: 2,214±414
Hunt type returns by macronutrient
kcal/h 1,492±173 292±135 575±56
Protein (g/h) 284±31 6.6±2.9 88±9
Fat (g/h) 22±3 1.6±.7 9±.95
Mean time allocation
19 Women 0.76±0.07 0.09±0.05 0.14±0.05
21 Men 0.31±0.07 0.63±.08 0.04±0.03
One explanation for this pattern might be that spearfishers are not maximizing calories, but other
macronutrients. But this appears not to be the case: protein return rates from shellfish collecting at
284±31 g/h are higher than from spearfishing at 6.6±2.9 g/h (t=6.78, df=68, P=0.0001). Fat return
rates are also higher for shellfish collecting at 22±3 g/h than for spearfishing at 1.6±0.7 g/h (t=4.808, 
df=68, P=0.0001).
Another possibility is that spearfishers prefer other benefits supplied by reef fish: they may be more
valuable as trade goods than shellfish prey. But this seems unlikely: shellfish collecting produces
larger harvests (1,962±247 g, n=44) than spearing (356±100 g, n=26) (t=24.857, df=68, P=0.0001).
Shellfish prey are also more likely to be shared: following a harvest of shellfish, on average 22% of
the take is shared to another household, while only 7.5% of a spearing harvest is shared.
- 6 -Finally, could choosing to spear fish instead of collecting shellfish as women do provide greater
consumption benefits in the long-term? The short-term costs are inescapable: while women maximize
their patch returns and the size of their meat harvests by stopping to take shellfish when encountered
on the reef, male spearfishers take a large cut in protein, fat, and energy income by ignoring shellfish
and continuing to search for fish to spear. There could be long-term benefits of such specialization if
by dividing labor and pooling harvests, male spearfishers and female shellfish collectors maintain
long-term shellfishing productivity on the reef. This could happen if the cooperative pooling unit (the
household) defended a reef territory, excluding other pooling units from foraging so that the future
benefits of conservation could be realized. But they do not: while reef territories are owned, the group
sharing use-rights to sections of reef is not equivalent to the pooling unit. Sections of reef are
considered extensions of residential plots: use-rights to residential plots are shared by all members of a
patriline. Only bounded clam gardens within reef territories are excludable and defendable by single
households, and these gardens are approximately 2-4 m in diameter, not large enough to permit
spearfishing. Any gains in long-term shellfish productivity would have to be shared by the entire
patriline, and all men within the patriline would have to forgo shellfish collecting, which is unlikely
since men do vary in the extent to which they collect shellfish. We cannot definitively exclude this
possibility, only note that it seems unlikely.
Spearfishers interested in maximizing return rates should not ignore shellfish while foraging on the
reef, but most of them do. The costs of choosing to spear fish do not appear to be balanced by benefits
received through cooperative gender specialization in macronutrient harvesting, nor through reciprocal
sharing. We propose that the benefits of spearfishing are gained through the honest signal value of
acquiring the prey rather than through consumption, and that honesty is maintained through
differential benefits: men of higher phenotypic quality benefit more than lower-quality individuals
because they can signal more intensely each time they signal.
Prediction 1: men who signal more frequently obtain greater benefits
If spearfishing is a competitive display, signalers should reap social benefits associated with more
frequent spearfishing, such as the benefits from gaining status through building a reputation as a
skilled spearfisher. In interviews with 33 Meriam men and women, none would nominate a slate of
"the best shellfish collectors," claiming that "being better than others" (i.e., getting larger harvests)
depends solely on working long hours, not on qualities intrinsic to the forager, and most nominated the
most frequently observed woman on the reef as "hardest-working shellfish collector." Across
individuals, shellfish-collecting harvest sizes are strongly contingent upon foraging time, whereas
spearfishing harvest sizes are not (Fig. 1). All interviewees were willing to nominate a slate of "the
best spearfishers." Because there was little variance in signal frequency among the majority of men
observed on the reef, we divided the signalers into the most frequent (1 man with 10 observed bouts)
and the least frequent (14 men with 19 bouts total). The most frequent signaler obtained 23 out of 61
(37.7%) total nominations by the 32 respondents (who nominated as many as three individuals). More
than 75% of respondents named the most frequent signaler as the best spearfisherman. None of the less
frequent signalers in our sample obtained any nominations at all. The remainder of the nominations
went to deceased individuals or those currently not active as spearfishers. 
- 7 -Fig. 1. Relationship between harvest size and bout length for spearfishing (A) and shellfish collecting 
(B). Foragers can predictably expect larger harvests with longer foraging time in shellfish collecting
but not spearfishing. Each point represents one randomly selected, fully observed bout, with the open 
circle representing the most active individual. Episodes are distributed throughout the tidal season of 
1994. A Linear regression with 95% confidence intervals for mean harvest size in kcal (y) on reef
patch foraging time in minutes (x). Harvest size=155+2x; r2=0.074, P=0.1990. B The same regression
for mean reef shellfishing (female foragers only) harvest size in kcal (y) on reef flat collecting time in
minutes (x). Harvest size=-6682+21.86x; r2=0.479, P=0.001
Prediction 2: signal intensity is linked to phenotypic quality
For the qualities signaled by spearfishing to be honestly advertised, high-quality spearfishers should
signal more intensely, because they gain greater marginal benefits or endure lower marginal costs per
unit signal. In addition to signal frequency (see above), good measures of signaling intensity are
harvest size and success rate. The mean harvest size per bout (in kcal) of the most frequent spearfisher 
(680±197, n=9) was larger than that obtained by other spearfishers (209±101, n=15; U=32, P=0.05).
His hunt type return rates were also higher at 616±356 kg/h versus 137±75 kg/h (U=32, P=0.49),
although his bouts were of equal mean length as those of the less frequent signalers (106±17.2 vs
102±15.6 min). The most frequent signaler’s return rates were still lower than he could achieve
shellfish collecting (U=72, P=0.002). The "frequent signaler" also had a much lower bout failure rate
than other men (failure rate per bout=22.2% vs 66.7%;   2=4.444, P=0.03).
Prediction 3: the signal is designed to be perceived by the intended audience
Since spearfishing is a solitary hunting activity that produces no large, widely consumed common
good, the signal elements contained in spearfishing are subtle and difficult to observe. Yet reputations
are still built in the absence of any overt boasting or tale-telling on the part of the forager himself, who
when successful, displays the typical behavior of a male solitary hunter: he returns home carrying his
catch quietly, albeit very visibly. The signal elements incorporated in spearfishing are conveyed to
observers in three distinct ways. (1) Reef activities are highly visible to a large section of the village
surrounding one’s residence, which contributes to the ease of observer perception of bout frequency.
(2) Spearfishermen make perception of harvest size easier by carrying their harvests openly in hand,
rather than carrying them in a bucket, as line fishers and shellfish collectors do. (3) Although bout
frequency is the signal element most easily observed, harvest size is usually made known to a large
- 8 -number of individuals through verbal communication. Hunts with large harvests are recounted many
times over, and stories about such success become part of local legend.
Turtle hunting as costly signal
Turtle hunting could serve as a competitive display if foragers can distinguish themselves from others
based on their skill. The signal(s) thus produced by turtle hunting would depend upon the kinds of
costs incurred. If turtle hunting is associated with lower foraging returns than other options, signals of
skill sent through hunting could honestly indicate the ability of the forager to expend time and energy
in a wasteful pursuit. If hunting has a high return but is associated with wide, unconditional, and costly
distributions of food, signals of skill could honestly indicate one’s quality (prosocial tendencies, or
ability to gain resource reserves through skill in other activities) by expending time and energy in
providing goods for public consumption.
Hunting turtles is indeed a competitive pursuit, with a very different complement of participants than
collecting. As the Meriam put it, anyone can collect turtle in the nesting season, but only certain men
have the ability to succeed at turtle hunting. Older and younger men, children, and women of all ages
participate in turtle collecting during the nesting season: 21% of turtle collections involve adult
females. In contrast, for turtle hunting, the only participants are males between the ages of 16 and 47
(mean age=31.6, n=38). Though a substantial proportion of Meriam men participate in turtle hunting at
some point in their lives, relatively few do so with regularity. In our sample of 37 turtle hunts
extending over two periods (1994-1995, and 1998), there were a total of 102 man-days expended, or
2.76 hunters per hunt (all hunts last 1 day or less). For the 87 man-days where hunters are individually
identified, there were a total of 40 unique individuals, or 2.18 hunts per hunter. But the 3 most active
men participated a total of 16 times, or 18.4% of the hunter-days of known individuals. Thus, 44.4% of
the 90 Meriam males aged 16-47 hunted at least once in the study period, but the 3 most active
participants (3.3% of males) were over five times more likely to engage in a turtle hunt than the
average Meriam male in this age range.
Turtle hunting entails a variety of costs that could ultimately be linked to signaler quality in a way that
ensures signals sent by hunting will remain honest (Smith and Bliege Bird 2000). Hunting may
involve (1) high opportunity costs in the form of passing over opportunities to acquire other resources
with a higher rate of return, (2) low consumption return rates (Bliege Bird and Bird 1997) as hunters
distribute meat to non-hunters following the hunt, or (3) high energetic, monetary, or time investment
costs of preparing for and conducting the hunt that reduce energetic return rates below that of other
more easily acquired resources. There may be other costs or risks of a social nature that provide a link
between turtle hunting and hunter quality, particularly the loss of social status should a hunter fail to
deliver turtles to a feast (see below).
Hunting season hunts
During the hunting season, between April and October, the goal of all hunts is to capture turtle for a
previously arranged feast. During major feasts, all those who come must be fed by the feast-giving
family and their allies, and the family can never predict precisely how many people will come to the
feast itself. Theoretically, the entire population of the island (over 400 men, women, and children) plus
many off-island visitors could attend, though attendance by 200 or fewer from both on and off the
island is typical (mean=174.9, range=49-343, n=54). Failure to provide turtle is a substantial cost to
the hunter’s status since all feast-goers will note the absence of turtle meat at the feast. Since hunts are
only undertaken a day or two prior to a feast, there are only as many hunts as there are feasts during
this season: in 1994 there were ten hunts for public feasts. During the hunting season, the turtle patch
is more distant, encounters with turtle are less common, and turtles are more difficult to detect and
- 9 -follow under water that is often murky and broken by swells and whitecaps created by the nearly
constant 20-knot southeast tradewinds during this season. After a successful hunt, hunters could expect
to obtain a per capita net return of 4,653 kcal/h if they divided the turtle among themselves; however,
all hunts during this season provision feasts, and hunters keep no share of the turtle they provide.
Hunters deliver the turtle whole to the feasting location. Hunters thus obtain negative per capita
consumption returns of -1,086 kcal/h, including the costs of traveling to the patch (see Bliege Bird and
Bird 1997 for details of the method of calculating net returns from turtle hunting).
Nesting season hunts
During the remainder of the year, hunts are undertaken for two reasons: to provision previously
arranged feasts (n=13), and to provision households (n=9). In this season, hunting is much easier and
hunters take on fewer costs: turtles are found on nearby reefs waiting to crawl onto the beaches to lay
eggs at night, the tradewinds have largely ceased, and in between monsoon storms, the water is clear,
calm, and visibility is excellent, allowing hunters to dog turtles more closely, to lose fewer, and to
more finely discern size and sex. Considering only successful hunts, hunters in the nesting season
could potentially obtain per capita returns of 8,061 kcal/h hunting for household consumption if they
did not share the meat with others. But hunters share more widely than collectors during the same
season, leaving their personal return rate from hunting for a feast at -1,633, and those from hunting for
household consumption at 814 (Table 2). Hunts during the nesting season should not happen at all if
hunters were interested solely in maximizing energetic return rates: during the nesting season,
collected turtle offers higher after-sharing energetic returns than hunted turtle. In addition, other
available resources are also more energetically productive: sardine netting provides 11,008±1,705 
(n=28) kcal/h before sharing - sardine harvests are shared only 5% of the time, leaving on average
10,864 kcal/h. If hunting turtle were solely about ensuring feast-goers can eat plenty of meat and fat,
men should net 50 kg of sardines with no chance of failure rather than spending the entire day chasing
turtle to risk coming back to the feast empty-handed.
Table 2. Turtle hunting per capita mean±SE net returns (kcal/h), number of hunts/collections (n), and
total number of participating acquirers by consumption type (house or feast), season (hunting or
nesting), and acquisition method (hunting or collecting). Net return rates are calculated as gross edible
energy captured minus energy expended in travel divided by time spent in travel, search, and handling.
Since travel costs are primarily the cost of fuel expended in outboard motors, the cost of fuel used (l) is
converted to calories of meat that could have been purchased in the local shop with the money used to
buy fuel for the hunting trip. Further details in Bliege Bird and Bird (1997)
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Hunting season Nesting season
Hunting 
season
Nesting
season 
House
Collecting (108 
acquirers)
21,875±2279 
(n=44)
5,068±922
Hunting (27 
acquirers)
8,061±970 
(n=9)
814±526
Feast
Collecting (56 
acquirers)
16913±1842 
(n=44)
1329±1127
Hunting (40 
acquirers)
4,653±1,213 
(n=10)
10,607±3566 
(n=13)
-468±660 -1,633±325
Total number of 
hunts
10 22
Total number of 
collections
08 8
Number of turtles 13 116
Turtle hunting in both seasons thus satisfies two of our criteria for consideration as an honest and
costly signal. Unlike turtle collecting, observers can distinguish skilled from unskilled individuals and
participation is restricted to a subset of the community; second, hunting has the potential to generate
high return rates among simultaneously available foraging alternatives (second only to sardine
netting), but does not result in much consumption benefit to the hunters since they share widely and
take no portion for themselves. As with spearfishing, we hypothesize that the benefits of hunting are
gained through the honest-signal value of acquiring the prey, rather than through consumption, and
that honesty is maintained through differential costs and benefits: men of higher phenotypic quality
benefit more or pay less than lower-quality individuals per unit signal.
Prediction 1: turtle hunting is differentially costly or beneficial
The relative costs and benefits of hunting turtle vary with the season: hunts are less costly in the
nesting season because the prey are found closer to home, but they are more ambiguous as a signal,
since turtles may also be collected at this time. Since there is the potential for dishonest signaling
(acquiring a turtle through collecting and passing it off as a hunted turtle), we predict that the benefits
of hunting during the nesting season are lower as well. We would thus expect that more skilled hunters
would be over-represented among hunting season hunts, which have the highest cost and the lowest
signal ambiguity, while the least skilled hunters would be over-represented among nesting season
hunts, when hunts are less costly as well as harder to discriminate from collecting. Among turtle hunt
participants, age is usually a good proxy for skill, since hunt participants move up in the hierarchy of
roles as they gain in skill over time, and since the skills necessary to be a good hunt leader are not
dependent upon size and strength. We thus expect jumpers to make the move to become hunt leaders
only during the nesting season. Hunt leaders during the hunting season (n=8) are in fact an average of
7.9 years older than hunt leaders (n=22) during the nesting season, a difference that is statistically
significant (U=41.5, P=0.05). In contrast, there is no difference in age of jumper according to season 
(df=37, t=-0.253, P=0.80). Of the 17 known current hunt leaders, the 4 youngest (aged 18-22) were
observed as hunt leaders only during the nesting season, and served only as jumpers during the hunting 
season.
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Turtle hunting provides evidence of skills that could honestly signal several relevant qualities:
environmental and ethological knowledge, risk-taking, strength and agility, leadership and
organizational abilities, and prosocial tendencies (e.g., expending time and energy in providing goods
for public consumption at feasts). Such information is presumably of interest to potential female
mates, their families, potential political alliance partners, or competitors for social status.
As detailed above, the most active hunters are a subset of the adult male population. The best turtle
hunt leaders are well known to community members: in a series of 32 interviews we conducted with
men and women in which informants were asked to nominate any three individuals of their choice for
"best turtle hunters," 3 men (all ones we had observed as the most frequent hunt leaders) garnered 38
(39.6%) of the 96 nominations (a total of 30 men were nominated for "best hunter" out of a pool of 90
or more males aged 16 and older). While several deceased individuals or older men no longer active as
hunt leaders were named among the "best hunters," no men currently active solely as jumpers were so
named. Jumpers are rarely individually credited by others for acquiring a turtle, and drivers are rarely
publicly credited with participation in the hunt. Feast-goers can readily name hunt leaders as providers
of the turtle, even several years after the feast, but when pressed for the names of other hunt
participants, lump all others together as "the boys." Jumpers may begin in this role as young as
15-17 years old; anecdotal evidence indicates that those who excel in this role and gain increasing
knowledge and peer respect eventually become hunt leaders, while others remain jumpers or cease
participating in turtle hunting.
Prediction 3: the signal is designed to be perceived by the intended audience
Signals do little good if they are not perceived and the information contained is not deciphered. We
propose that when signals are designed to acquire general social status or political dominance,
broadcast efficiency will be increased by directing them at larger audiences, rather than small subsets
of interested parties (as might be predicted if the signal elements of hunting were directed solely at
potential mating partners). Thus, we predict that hunted turtles should be shared more widely than
collected turtles; in other words, that individuals should choose to hunt for larger audiences, and to
collect when audiences (the number of households attracted to the turtle and consuming portions) are
predicted to be smaller. Because turtles cannot be collected during the hunting season, we control for
the effects of season. We thus predict that audience size should have a significant effect on acquisition
method within the nesting season only: when larger audiences are available, men should prefer to hunt
rather than collect. During the 1994-1995 nesting season, hunts for which the number of consumers
were known (n=22) averaged 26.7±23.7 households, while collections (n=80) averaged 18.7±19.0
households consuming, a significant difference (t=-1.649, df=100, P=0.05).
Individuals who acquire turtles for feasts have a large built-in audience; however, turtles acquired for
household provisioning will be shared among a smaller number of households. If hunting serves as an
honest signal and hunters wish to broadcast the signal widely, turtles acquired for household
provisioning should also be shared more widely when hunted than when collected (controlling for
season). During the 1994-1995 nesting season, there were 9 hunts and 44 collections to supply turtles
for household consumption (Table 2). As predicted, hunted consumption turtles were shared to more
households (7.5±3.0) than collected consumption turtles (4.6±2.5), and the statistical difference is
strongly significant (U=64, P=0.015). Because the number of households receiving portions of a
hunted turtle is larger than the number receiving portions of a collected turtle, portions shared to each
household should be smaller, but they do not seem to be so, because hunters kept less for themselves
and their own households than did collectors (mean portion kept (kcal) for hunters=7,780±2,194 kcal, 
n=38; for collectors=14,387±2,631 kcal, n=123) although the difference is not significant (t-test on
- 12 -log-transformed kcal kept, t=0.682, df=159, P=0.50).
Discussion
Although our sample of spearfishers is too small to define a continuum in level of skill, spearfishing
does seem to exhibit strong potential for competitive signaling. The most frequent signaler obtains
much higher gains per unit patch residence time than other spearfishers. Harvest size (the most easily
observed indicator of return rates) is likely to be linked to phenotypic quality in the form of hand-eye
coordination, stealth, and patience, and provides an immediate signal of forager quality. Success rate is
a signal element contributing to the long-term reputation of the spearfisher. High success rates in
conjunction with large harvest size ensure that large harvests are more likely due to skill
(forager-dependent variability) than to luck (forager-independent variability). As a result, the most
active spearfisher gains the benefits of an enhanced spearing reputation that more infrequent signalers
do not seem to enjoy. Spearing thus has the potential to serve as an honest signal of a spearfisherman’s
phenotypic quality.
Although we have demonstrated the potential for signaling, and the bias in men’s foraging toward
resources which have high competitive signaling potential, precisely how both signaler and observer
ultimately benefit from the signal is not clear. We do know that good spearing men are widely
recognized, and that this adds to their social status within the community. Potential competitors might
also gain from knowing who is a better man with a spear, although the knowledge certainly would
have been more useful in the past when spears were the major means of ambushing competitors.
Spearing signals may not be designed to appeal to potential mates interested only in marrying
provisioners. A man who demonstrates his intention to provision a household by collecting shellfish
may be more attractive to such women than a man who demonstrates his intention to engage in a
competitive, status-enhancing pursuit.
Turtle hunters seem to have very different goals than turtle collectors. Compared to collecting, hunting
is more costly (in time, energy, and risk), provides meat less efficiently, and is associated with wider
distributions of meat and larger audiences to witness the hunters’ prowess. Hunters keep no meat for
themselves unless (quite rarely) hunting for household consumption, in which case they still keep less
and share more than turtle collectors. Hunters take on a variety of costs for which they are not
materially compensated: they expend more time and energy in hunting than they do collecting, they
spend more money for fuel, they spend time organizing and preparing the hunting team and its
equipment prior to the hunt, and they deliver the meat to be consumed by large audiences at feasts.
The ability to bear such costs appears to be linked to hunter quality. Because a hunter is an organizer
and decision-maker, his abilities peak as he gains skill and experience: Those named as the best
hunters are older than other hunt participants, such as jumpers. As we predicted, when hunting was
less costly and more difficult to discriminate from collecting (i.e., during the nesting season), hunters
were younger, in fact composed almost entirely of ambitious jumpers preparing to be hunt leaders
themselves. Furthermore, the signals sent by hunting are efficiently broadcast: hunts were associated
with larger numbers of consumers overall than collections during the nesting season and during
household consumption events. Most feast-goers (audience members), when quizzed, know the
identity of hunters, but not the identity of jumpers.
Since the low take-home returns of hunters providing turtle for household consumption and the
negative take-home returns of hunters providing turtle for a feast are due to widespread sharing, the
argument could be made that the signal cost is eventually recovered in the form of meat or other goods
or services returned as payback for the hunter’s gift. In other words, perhaps RA by the recipients of a
hunter’s largesse erases the cost of his signal (Sosis and Hill 1997). The stable maintenance of RA
requires that the provisioning of a turtle be contingent upon the eventual receipt of counterbalancing
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used in other fitness-enhancing ways. Previous tests of predictions based on RA in the form of risk
reduction reciprocity for sharing of collected and hunted turtles combined received little support
(Bliege Bird and Bird 1997). Further tests of alternative forms of reciprocity are being conducted to
evaluate this line of explanation (R. Bliege Bird, G. Kushnik, E.A. Smith, D. Bird, C. Hadley,
unpublished data), as will be detailed in future publications.
While we have measured the cost of hunting using direct material currencies such as time, energy, and
money, there are additional social costs that, though difficult to measure, may be of equal or even
greater importance. Turtles provided for feasts are needed by community elders (feast hosts) to
enhance their own status by ensuring there is plenty of meat for guests. If successful hunting is a
reliable signal of the hunter’s underlying quality (as defined above), lower-quality individuals would
be expected to fail on turtle hunts more often and thus pay a higher marginal cost per turtle delivered
to a feast (i.e., per unit signal). Failing to deliver a turtle to a feast also entails significant social costs,
since the feast-holders are expected to serve turtle to their guests, and everyone will know when a
hunter has failed. High-quality individuals should have a lower probability of failure and thus a high
ratio of social benefits (from successful hunts) to costs (from failures). Low-quality individuals may
face a large enough risk of failing to produce a net social deficit from their signaling attempts, and
hence may avoid signaling at all, making it difficult to test this hypothesis. We do have anecdotal
evidence that some men have attempted turtle hunting in the past, and given up when they found they
were "no good at it." In addition, the facts (detailed above) that only certain men engage in turtle
hunting, that only an older and more experienced subset of these become hunt leaders, and that hunt
leader status is widely recognized in the community, all indicate that success in this endeavor is not
equally available.
To qualify as costly signaling, hunting must not only be honest, but must also reveal signaler quality.
Given the three distinct roles played by hunt participants, we propose (but cannot currently test) that at
least four distinct dimensions of underlying quality could be signaled through turtle hunting: (1)
physical quality (such as strength, stamina, agility, and risk-taking); (2) cognitive skills (involving the
ecological and ethological knowledge needed to successfully locate and capture turtles); (3) leadership
skills (charisma and organizational abilities), and (4) generosity (ability and willingness to bear the
high immediate cost in time, money, and energy of providing collective goods without direct
compensation). We expect the first dimension to apply primarily to the younger men who serve as
"jumpers," whereas the other three dimensions refer primarily to hunt leaders.
The results of additional analysis in progress show that the display of such qualities is correlated with
higher social status and higher age-specific reproductive success of hunters and their mates than other
Meriam (E.A. Smith, R. Bliege Bird, D. Bird, unpublished data). As explained to us by Meriam
hunters and their mates, the signals sent by hunters are likely to be part of both political strategies, in
which hunters demonstrate to other men their honest intention to work for the public good, and
reproductive strategies, in which hunters demonstrate their "willingness to work hard" in order to gain
access to the "best girl" (Kaddy, personal communication; Passi, personal communication). Hunters
know that spreading one’s influence widely via the provisioning of collective goods at feasts increase
social status over the long-term among the community as a whole, while less public-minded
status-enhancing activities (like stealing land or selfishly hoarding resources) provides narrow,
short-term status in only a small pool of competitors.
- 14 -Implications for the sexual division of labor
One intriguing result of our analysis are the gender differences in participation in those activities with
high signaling potential. With spearfishing particularly, the differences were not consistent with the
common notion that a sexual division of labor in humans functions to maximize the productivity of a
cooperating male-female pair (see Bliege Bird 1999). We propose that the signaling benefits attached
to certain foraging strategies may often change the valuation of certain prey items for some
individuals. While foraging on the reef, males make choices that fail to maximize their macronutrient
return rates. These choices appear to be due to the tradeoffs men face over foraging for highly
productive resources which have little signaling value (shellfish) against foraging for less productive
resources with high signaling value (speared fish). Likewise, choosing to hunt turtle for feasts provides
much lower consumption benefits than collecting turtle for the household, but greater signaling
benefits. Adult women only participate in cooperative turtle collection, comprising 21% of all
participants, and do not hunt.
These data suggest that foraging sex differences may not simply be a result of women preferring plants
and men meat, or women preferring small harvests while men prefer large ones, or even women
preferring prey which can be more easily harvested while children are present (shellfish are just as
difficult as fish to collect with small children). Where there is a choice in foraging method, men seem
to prefer to acquire meat through more risky methods that more easily differentiate the skill of
individual foragers, while women seem to prefer less risky methods carrying little potential for
discrimination of forager quality. We propose that sex-biased foraging preferences may arise due to
the differing benefits each sex receives from investing in competition for status through signaling
certain genotypic or phenotypic qualities.
Foraging as communication
As Hawkes (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993) first hypothesized, some kinds of hunting may persist in human
populations because some foragers gain benefits from widely disseminating knowledge about their
prowess relative to other individuals through the hunting of large and risky prey items. While Hawkes 
(1993) stressed the benefits that hunters obtain from providing collective goods (as with turtle hunting
and unconditional sharing), our results show that benefits may also come in the absence of any
material good provided to observers (as with spearfishing) as a result of honestly revealing hidden
information to interested parties. Differential costs and benefits for signalers of higher and lower
quality serve to keep the information honest and valuable to observers.
Our results suggest that CST has the potential to account for many puzzling aspects of human foraging
strategies, and to substantially modify received views about optimal foraging, food sharing, and other
phenomena central to studies of human behavioral ecology in small-scale societies (Winterhalder and
Smith 2000). CST may illuminate otherwise puzzling behaviors such as preference for prey and patch
types which provide fewer energetic benefits than other possible choices and are more costly on other
levels, if the costs (or benefits) incurred are linked to signaler quality, so that poorer-quality signalers
cannot consistently maintain or reach the same level of signaling as higher-quality signalers. Signaling
hypotheses have only just begun to be tested as a cause for variability in human foraging strategies.
Sosis (2000) has suggested that the benefits of signaling may explain why Ifaluk men engage in
energetically inefficient fishing methods associated with costly ritual preparations. Such benefits may
also explain why Ache men prefer to hunt widely shared game even though palm starch collection
would offer higher on-encounter energetic returns (Hill et al. 1987; Hawkes 1991).
- 15 -We are not proposing that the signaling benefits provide the only motivation for hunters and meat
recipients, but simply that they provide an additional factor of evolutionary and motivational
significance shaping hunting and sharing decisions. Thus the social and political signaling benefits of
at least certain forms of hunting may compensate for any economic "wastefulness," in the same way
that Veblen (1899) explained both "conspicuous consumption" of material goods and "conspicuous
leisure" as instances of "conspicuous expenditure" designed to gain or maintain social benefits only
indirectly related to economic advantage. However, CST has the potential to explain not only
"wasteful" foraging activities, but any behavior in which higher-quality individuals obtain higher
marginal benefits because they can better absorb the cost of the behavior, and where such behavior is
efficiently broadcast to the proper observers (potential mates, allies, or competitors).
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